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Abstract
Significant prior research has shown that facilitation is a critical part of GSS transition. This study examines an under-researched
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simulator offers insights into the separate and combined effects of common facilitation practices during the lifecycle of GSS
transition. These insights can help the Collaboration Engineering community to identify and package the facilitation routines that
are critical for group members to achieve self-sustained GSS use and understand how facilitation routines should be adapted to
different stages of GSS transition lifecycle. Moreover, they indicate the value of the multi-agent approach in uncovering new
insights and representing the issue of GSS transition with a new view.
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Using Multi-Agent Simulation to Explore the
Contribution of Facilitation to GSS Transition
“A word processor that is immediately liked by one in five prospective customers and disliked by the
rest could be a big success. A groupware application to support teams of five nurses that initially
appeals to only one nurse in five is a big disaster.” (Grudin, 1994, p. 101).

1. Introduction
Group support systems (GSS) transition, a central concern of Collaboration Engineering (CE), is the
process that starts when some members of a team express interest in using a GSS and ends when the
team of users has become self-sustaining (Briggs et al., 1998). The Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST)
(DeSanctis and Poole, 1994) suggests that GSS transition occurs through the interplay among
technologies, social structures, and human interaction. When a GSS is first introduced into a group, the
group goes through an appropriation process by which members examine the technology structures and
agree on when and how to use them, and eventually stabilize the appropriation (Dennis et al., 2001). An
important implication of AST is that to codify and package best practices of GSS facilitation, CE
researchers need to understand not only facilitation functions in technology and task management, but
also how facilitation contributes to a self-sustained agreement among group members regarding GSS
use.
Achieving continuous agreement among group members is a unique challenge to GSS transition
(Grudin, 1994). To streamline the terminology, we refer to the GSS transition with the agreement
challenge as “self-sustained GSS use” in the rest of this paper. GSS are suites of collaborative
software tools that combine communication, computer, and decision technologies to support problem
formulation and solutions in teamwork (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Briggs et al., 2003). Most GSS
are only useful when a high percentage of team members use them. For single-user systems, this
problem does not apply. For expensive organization-wide systems, top management can step in to
force the technology transition (Rogers, 1983; Cooper and Zmud, 1990; Lucas et al., 1990; Grudin,
1994), however, if the financial impact is less salient (Briggs et al., 2003), top management may not
be motivated to intervene in GSS transition. Moreover, GSS users tend to be inter-divisional, interorganizational, or industry-level collaboration teams. A top-down solution may not be applicable to
such teams. Because of this unique challenge in GSS transition, technology transition theories that
either focus on individual users or organizations cannot be readily applied to the context of GSS
(Gallivan, 2001).
Several studies have recognized that self-sustained GSS use should be viewed as a critical mass
problem, because it is consistent with the notion that “some threshold of participants or action has to
be crossed before a social movement ‘explodes’ into being” (Oliver et al., 1985, p. 523; Fichman,
1992; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Gallivan, 2001).
Theories of critical mass emphasize
management of interactions between actors (Oliver et al., 1985; Markus, 1987). Based on the notion
of critical mass, AST indicates that human interactions underlying self-sustained GSS use can be
characterized as interdependent decision making in that the degree to which members believe that
other members know and accept the use of GSS positively affects their expected value of GSS
(Markus, 1987; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). Taken together, the critical mass view and AST imply
that the challenge of GSS transition is essentially a problem of managing interdependencies between
decision-making of GSS users. In other words, self-sustained GSS use boils down to a coordination
problem, as coordination is defined as “managing dependencies between activities” (Malone and
Crowston, 1994, p. 90).
A central premise of the coordination theory is that in order to overcome the coordination problem,
additional activities must be performed (Crowston, 1997). These activities, called coordination
mechanisms, serve primarily to manage interdependencies between actors and thereby help actors
cross the threshold required for a social movement to explode into being (e.g., self-sustained GSS
use). Prior research from the laboratory and the field implies that GSS facilitation practices are in
effect coordination mechanisms that help to manage the interdependent decision making of GSS
users. For example, a number of studies have shown that restricting process structure, a common
facilitation practice, is effective in producing agreement on GSS use (e.g., Wheeler and Valacich,
1996; Dennis et al., 2001). This finding implies that one of the coordination mechanisms embodied by
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facilitation is limiting the number of alternatives available to a group. While the literature has
accumulated implicit evidence on how facilitation contributes as a coordination mechanism in GSS
transition, few have explicitly explored the theoretical explanation and empirical implications of such
mechanism. This knowledge gap can prevent CE researchers from identifying and packaging
important facilitation routines, and consequently impair the effectiveness of the CE approach in
promoting self-sustained success with GSS. To this end, the first research question of this study is:
•

How do facilitation practices, as coordination mechanisms, intervene with the interdependent
decision making of GSS users and thereby contribute to GSS transition?

In addition, a study about the coordination mechanisms in self-sustained GSS use can help us
recognize the dynamic and adaptive aspects of GSS facilitation. Scripted facilitation has been
criticized for a lack of adaptability (Anson et al., 1995). This can be attributed to the focus on
technology and task management in extant CE practice. Compared with human interaction, task and
technology characteristics are much more stable over time and, thus, facilitation routines for task and
technology management rarely entail a dynamic dimension. On the other hand, group-level
agreement on GSS use is an emergent property; it arises over time from the coordination of
interdependent individual decisions about GSS use. Thus, facilitation practices, as coordination
mechanisms, need to be adapted to the dynamic patterns of human interaction. An understanding of
adaptive facilitation practices can help explain why an organization would eagerly embrace a GSS for
two years and then abandon it (Briggs et al., 2003). Therefore, the second research question of this
study is:
•

How should GSS facilitation be adapted—given the dynamic process of interdependent decision
making inherent in GSS—and, thereby, stabilize GSS use?

The dynamic, adaptive, and emergent characteristics of GSS transition make multi-agent modeling a
proper approach for this study. The multi-agent framework is a lens through which we can see how
interactions among adaptive individuals in a dynamic environment give rise to group level behaviors
such as self-sustained GSS use. The interface between GSS transition and a multi-agent framework
is in many ways natural and inevitable. At an abstract level, both deal with similar conceptual issues
such as dynamic change, adaptation, and evolution of interacting parts in a system. Both seek
answers for similar questions such as what are the multiple pathways by which structures can
emerge, stabilize or change in systems? Ultimately, we employ the multi-agent simulator as a tool to
uncover new insights and ask new questions that can help researchers perceive the issue of GSS
transition in a fresh light.
In the remainder of the paper, we first discuss the theoretical development and our propositions about
contributions of facilitation as coordination mechanisms in self-sustained GSS use. Following the
theoretical section, we describe the design, the calibration and the validation of the multi-agent
simulator. Next, we discuss the experimentation in the multi-agent simulator and the insights gained
through the experimentation process. Then, we suggest how the findings from multi-agent simulator
can contribute to the CE literature and how the simulator can be utilized by the CE community to
create knowledge.

2. Theoretical Development
In this section, we first discuss major technology transition models to provide background information
for our study. Then, by borrowing insights from coordination theory, economics, and prior research on
GSS, facilitation, and Collaboration Engineering, we formalize the human interactions underlying GSS
transition as strategic behaviors in a game-theoretic coordination game (Roth, 1995; Van Huyck et al.,
1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudhuri et
al., 2001). The contribution of facilitation is theorized as interventions during the course of the game.

2.1. GSS Transition
The obvious starting place for discussing GSS transition is the stream of research on user acceptance of
new technology. In the information system (IS) literature, models of technology acceptance are probably
among the most mature research areas. Since several studies have provided thorough reviews of
Journal of the Association for Information Systems
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technology acceptance models (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2003), our discussion here will highlight the main
findings and focus on the connection between the individual-level acceptance models and GSS
transition.
Most theories and models about technology acceptance are focused on an individual user as the unit of
analysis. The basic premise underlying these models is that an individual’s reactions to using information
technology affect his or her intentions to use the technology, which consequently influences the actual
use of the technology (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Based on the premise, different models have theorized a
range of determinants of intention and/or use of technology. For example, the Technology Acceptance
Model (TAM) (Davis, 1989; Davis et al., 1989) posits that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of
use are of the primary user reactions to technology. They mediate the effects of external variables such
as system characteristics and development process on intention to use a new technology. In the IS
literature, TAM has been recognized as the most influential model explaining information technology
acceptance (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). In addition to the constructs defined in TAM, other models
have proposed constructs such as attitude toward behavior, motivation to use technology, perceived
behavioral control, affect toward use, and self-efficacy.
Although most of the technology adoption models focus on individual user intention/usage, they hint at
the importance of human interaction to technology transition by defining social influence (i.e., subjective
norm) as a determinant of intended or actual use of technology. For example, based on the Theory of
Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior, the original TAM was expanded to take into
account other people’s influence on a focal person’s intention or usage (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000).
Specifically, the social influence factor, called subjective norm, is defined as a “person’s perception that
most people who are important to him think he should or should not perform the behavior in question”
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, p. 302). This construct provides a rationale for us to explore human
interactions in GSS transition. One thing to note is that the human interaction underlying subjective norm
is different from that for coordination. First, subjective norm is a one-way interaction—others influence the
focal user—while coordination involves two-way interaction—others influence and are influenced by the
focal user. Second, subjective norm affects how a focal user perceives the value of a technology, not the
actual utility of the technology. In contrast, coordination in GSS transition affects how much value users
gain from the technology.
TAM has been employed in a few GSS studies. Researchers often find that TAM has limited applicability
to group-level technology transition. For example, Dasgupta et al. (2002) adapted constructs from TAM
to a laboratory study about the acceptance of a GSS application in an education setting. Contrary to the
prediction of TAM, their findings showed that perceived usefulness has a negative impact on actual
system usage. In another field study about GSS transition, Briggs et al. (1998) had to extend and modify
constructs of TAM in order to account for the rich dynamics they observed in a group setting. They
produced the Technology Transition Model (TTM) as an extension of TAM. In a later study, Briggs et al.
(2003) summarized the main limitation of TAM: it does not account for how interactions among group
members may lead to an agreement of GSS use and how the agreement can be sustained over time.
The limitations of TAM and other individual-focused models necessitate alternative approaches or
theories to study GSS transition. Among the alternatives, Collaboration Engineering and the critical mass
view are particularly relevant to this study.
Collaboration Engineering is an approach that specifically focuses on acceptance and use of GSS.
Rather than focusing on an individual user’s perception, intention and use of technology, CE shifts
attention to a key enabler of GSS transition, facilitation. CE researchers recognize that an essential
difficulty in GSS transition is the lack of ongoing intervention provided by professional facilitators. To
address this problem, CE researchers have attempted to codify and package best practices of facilitators
so that practitioners can execute the facilitation routines on their own. Currently, CE researchers have
documented approximately 70 such packaged facilitation routines (Kolfschoten et al., 2006), and have
observed their effectiveness in achieving self-sustained GSS success in the field (Kolfschoten et al.,
2006).
Critical mass has been suggested by several studies as an alternative perspective through which to
examine GSS transition. For example, Fichman (1992) and Gallivan (2001) both proposed the critical
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mass theory as a more appropriate framework than TAM in explaining group level acceptance of
technology. Grudin (1994) identified critical mass as a unique challenge to GSS transition. In AST,
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) pointed out that the interdependence among GSS users’ values and
behaviors is consistent with the notion of critical mass. Although few researchers have developed their
suggestions into formal research models, they contribute to the literature by calling for research attention
on the interactions of GSS users rather than the intention/use of individual users. These studies motivate
our focus on the coordination of GSS users and the coordination mechanisms brought about by
facilitation practices.
A review of the technology acceptance literature reveals that self-sustained GSS use is a promising yet
under-researched area. Up to now, few studies have formally characterized the coordination during GSS
transition and how facilitation moderates the dynamics of coordination and eventually leads to selfsustained GSS use. Based on AST, Figure 1 illustrates the complementary relationship between this
study and the literature. Among technology, task, and human interaction, TAM and CE have offered
insights into the impact of technology and task structures on GSS transition, while our focus is on the
path from human interaction to GSS transition and the moderating effect of facilitation on the path. Below,
we first theorize on the interdependent human interactions during GSS transition and then discuss the
contributions of facilitation.

Figure 1. The Complementary Relationship between This Study and the Literature
Notes: The thin arrows are the focus of TAM and CE literature, while the thick arrows are the focus of
this study.

2.2. Coordination of GSS users
As discussed in the introduction, achieving self-sustained GSS use can be articulated as a
coordination problem for GSS users. In order to understand how facilitation contributes to the
emergence and stabilization of the group-level agreement on GSS use, we need to first characterize
the interdependent decision making of GSS users. Economic and social scholars have developed a
family of coordination games to mathematically analyze the interdependencies among individuals and
derive the group level outcomes. Among the family of coordination games, we employ a minimum
effort coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria (see Appendix A for a tutorial), because it
allows us to take into account the complexities in a GSS context, such as task/technology fit and
asymmetry among group members in terms of effort invested in GSS use. Specifically, we
characterize group members’ decisions about GSS adoption as the dilemma between reserving one’s
own effort or investing the effort in adopting the GSS and taking the risk of wasting their effort if not
enough coworkers adopt the same GSS. Meanwhile, because the efficiency of GSS varies across
different tasks, in order to gain the most benefit, members have to simultaneously recognize the most
efficient GSS for a given task and adopt the system together. In repeated play of this game,
individuals adjust their choices based on the payoff of their past decisions. This allows self-sustained
GSS use to emerge or collapse based on the dynamic interaction of individual decisions over time.
Journal of the Association for Information Systems
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Experimental economists find that it is extremely difficult to achieve coordination success in minimum
effort games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (see Weber, 2006 for a review). In relation to GSS
transition, this means that it is difficult to achieve self-sustained GSS use. This finding helps to explain
why GSS tend to be self-extinguishing (Briggs et al., 2003). To prevent coordination failure,
economists have recognized two general interventions. The first intervention is to mechanistically
focus players’ beliefs on a particular equilibrium, usually through pre-play communication (Cooper et
al., 1992). This intervention helps players accept the risk of coordination and agree to choose the
Pareto optimal action. The second intervention is to reduce the tension between individual risk and
group efficiency by changing the payoff structure of a coordination game (Cooper et al., 1990; Van
Huyck et al., 1990). This approach makes the Pareto optimal action less risky and more attractive and,
thereby, induces more coordination success. Based on prior findings of interventions in the minimumeffort coordination game, the premise of this paper is that the coordination mechanisms of GSS
facilitation intervene with the interdependent decision making of GSS users by (1) reducing
uncertainty about other members’ choices of GSS feature (i.e., help members accept the risk of
coordination) and (2) reducing uncertainty about the potential value of a chosen GSS for a given task
(i.e., make the Pareto optimal action less risky). The section below elaborates on this premise.

2.3. GSS Facilitation
According to Hayne (1999, p. 73), facilitation is defined as:
1. to make easier or less difficult; help forward; an action, a process;
2. a set of factors or behaviors carried out before, during, and after a meeting to help a group
achieve its goals;
3. moving from the known to the unknown.
It is implied that facilitation is not confined to services provided by professional facilitators. Any factor
or behavior that helps a group achieve GSS transition can be considered facilitation, regardless
whether it is brought about by a facilitator, a trainer, a leader, or a software program. Our theorization
of facilitation is in this broad sense.
Past research has shown that there are multiple approaches for facilitation to affect GSS acceptance
and use. We summarize the facilitation routines observed in prior studies in Table 1. Among the
variety of facilitation approaches, we identify and focus on four basic practices. The first is GSS
championing (e.g., Nunamaker et al., 1991; George et al., 1992), which can be performed by a
facilitator or a group leader. This practice can boost users’ enthusiasm and the perceived
effectiveness of GSS and thus promote GSS use. The second practice is restricting GSS choices
(e.g., Hayne, 1999; Dennis et al., 2001), usually done by using highly restrictive software. This
practice “forces” members to achieve self-sustained GSS use by minimizing alternative ways of GSS
use. The third practice is task and technology help (e.g., Griffith et al., 1998; Dennis and Garfield,
2003). This is usually provided by professional facilitators. By directly intervening in how users employ
GSS to perform tasks, facilitators can improve task/technology fit and enable members to leverage
more benefits from GSS. The fourth practice is training (e.g., Dennis et al., 2001; Dennis and Garfield,
2003), which can be provided by a trainer or a facilitator. By educating members about the structures
and use of GSS, “it moves the group more quickly down the gradual path to the stabilization of
appropriate structures and habitual routines” (Dennis et al., 2001, p. 173).
The four basic facilitation practices can be mapped onto the two general interventions of coordination
failure in a minimum-effort game: (1) reducing uncertainty about other members’ choice of GSS
feature and (2) reducing uncertainty about the potential values of chosen GSS for a given task.
Specifically, both championing and restricting reduce the uncertainty about others’ GSS use by
increasing members’ willingness to coordinate and mechanically focusing members’ choice on a few
GSS features, respectively. Meanwhile, task and technology help reduces the uncertainty about the
value of a chosen GSS for a given task by directly intervening with the task and technology match
during group meetings. Training reduces the same uncertainty by enabling group members to make
sensible use of GSS for a given task on their own. The mapping from the common facilitation
practices to interventions of a minimum-effort coordination game (see Figure 2 for an illustration)
indicates that:

257

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Vol. 10 Special Issue pp. 252-277 March 2009

Nan&Johnston /Multi-Agent Simulation

Table 1: GSS Facilitation Practices1 Identified in the Literature
Study

GSS Facilitation Practices
*

Nunamaker et al., 1991;
George et al., 1992

*
*
*

Dickson et al., 1993

Clawson et al., 1993

Anson et al., 1995

Orlikowski and Yates, 1995

Niederman et al., 1996

*

Boiney, 1998

Chauffeur-driven support (helps the group
with the technology) (3)
Facilitator-driven support (helps the group
with the process and the technology) (3)

*
*
*

Selects and prepares technology (3)
Creates comfort with technology (3)
Understands technology and its capabilities
(4)

*

positively influence people’s perceptions of
GSS effectiveness (1)
help people better understand and organize
their use of GSSs (3, 4)

*
*

Metastructuring, i.e., direct intervention into
GSS use process (3)

*

encourage GSS adoption through good
matching of tools to tasks (3)
demonstrate GSS’s added value (1)
provide “low-key” technology that allows
group members to focus on tasks (3)

*
*
*

Griffith et al., 1998

Reduce technical complexity by initiating
and terminating specific software tools (3)
Training (4)
Champion/sponsor of GSSs (1)

*
*

ensure the advantages of GSSs are
accessible to group members (3)
run the technology for group members (3)
assist those members who are not masters
of the technology (3)

*

Explain the use and purpose of GSS
capabilities and options (4)

*
Hayne, 1999

*
*

Selecting the technology that fits a group’s
goal (3)
Take care of logistics of technology use (3)
Restrictiveness (2)

Niederman and Volkema, 1999

*

Explain operations of GSS (4)

Dennis et al., 2001

*
*
*

Direct intervention into GSS use process (3)
Restrictive GSS (2)
Training (4)

Vreede et al., 2002a, b

*
*
*
*

Choose and prepare GSS technology (2)
Introduce GSS to users (4)
Being available during GSS use process (3)
Structure the GSS use process (3)

Dennis and Garfield, 2003

*
*

Starting the GSS (3)
Training (4)

Notes: numbers in parentheses indicate the basic facilitation practices they relate to. 1. champion;
2. restrict choice; 3. task and technology help; 4. training.

1

We only focus on the facilitation practices related to GSS transition. Facilitation relates directly to the problem
being discussed in a group meeting is not the focus of this study.
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Figure 2. The Multiple Pathways of GSS Facilitation
Proposition 1: Facilitation as a coordination mechanism can induce self-sustained GSS
use by reducing uncertainties through multiple pathways.
Due to the multiple pathways for achieving self-sustained GSS use, the effectiveness of facilitation
practices may vary at different points in the GSS transition lifecycle. Facilitation practices that directly
change how GSS users perceive or use the technology in tasks may be more effective in the initial
phase of GSS transition, because they do not require users to spend time learning functions of GSS.
On the other hand, facilitation practices that help users truly understand GSS may be more effective
in the long run, because they sustain GSS use by stabilizing the habitual routines of GSS users
(Johnson and Rice, 1987; Dennis and Garfield, 2003). For example, restricting may work better than
training to initiate GSS use, because it mechanically forces GSS users to adopt the same system

Figure 3. A Possible Pattern of Effectiveness of Different Facilitation Practices in
GSS Transition Lifecycle
Notes: The shapes of the function lines are fictional; they are not part of our proposition.
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rather than gradually helps users voluntarily choose the same GSS. However, in the long run, training
may become more effective, because training empowers GSS users to make sensible use of the
technology without the ongoing intervention of facilitators. Figure 3 shows a possible pattern of
effectiveness for different facilitation practices over time.
Proposition 2: Different facilitation practices can have varied effectiveness in initiating
and sustaining GSS use during the lifecycle of GSS transition.
In summary, an integration of AST, experimental economics, and GSS research suggests that facilitation
practices, as coordination mechanisms, intervene with the interdependent decision making of GSS users
by reducing the uncertainties in the coordination problem; effectiveness of facilitation practices may vary
during the lifecycle of GSS transition due to the different pathways for facilitation to induce self-sustained
GSS use. The propositions offer a basis for CE researchers to evaluate the causal mechanisms
underlying the common facilitation practices (P1), and to understand how to adapt them to the dynamic
process of GSS user coordination during GSS transition (P2).

3. Method
We employ multi-agent modeling to examine the contributions of facilitation to self-sustained GSS use. A
multi-agent model (also called bottom-up modeling or artificial social systems) is an emerging paradigm
to analyze how heterogeneous, autonomous behaviors of actors/agents generate global macroscopic
regularities of social phenomena (Epstein, 1999). In a multi-agent model, “fundamental social structures
and group behaviors emerge from the interaction of individuals operating in artificial environments under
rules that place only bounded demands on each agent’s information and computational capacity”
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996, p. 4). Essentially, multi-agent modeling helps us understand how repeated
interactions among actors give rise to collective behaviors in an entire system. It has been employed to
study a variety of social, economic, and organizational issues such as information diffusion and social
change (Carley, 1991), exchange of goods in a market (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), media and
organizational culture and performance (Canessa and Riolo, 2003), transactive memory in teams (Ren et
al., 2006), and knowledge transfer in organizations (Cataldo and Carley, 2001).
Compared with traditional social science paradigms such as statistical estimating and differential
equations, a multi-agent framework has five unique characteristics. First, it takes a bottom-up
approach. Rather than seeking a centralized control mechanism for orderly behaviors of a system, a
multi-agent framework explores whether decentralized interactions among autonomous actors can
lead to system-level regularities. Second, a multi-agent framework assumes that actors engage in
adaptive rather than fully rational behaviors (Axelrod, 1997). Actors with limited information and
foresight optimize their strategies through interacting with others. Third, a multi-agent framework
allows heterogeneity among actors, whereas traditional social scientists often suppress agent
heterogeneity in order to make their models tractable (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Fourth, multi-agent
modeling focuses on dynamic processes that produce or disrupt equilibria rather than the static
nature of equilibria (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Last, traditional statistical or multi-equation modeling
assumes linear, deterministic, or independent relationships among parameters, whereas a multi-agent
framework explicitly takes into account nonlinear, nondeterministic, and interdependent interactions
among multiple levels of actors. These unique characteristics make it a valuable approach to examine
the decentralized, dynamic, and adaptive human interactions underlying GSS use and the multiple
pathways for facilitation to induce critical mass to spur GSS transition.
In addition, the computational modeling approach offers several advantages compared with
laboratory experiments or field studies. First, it gives researchers precision and control in the
measurement and manipulation of crucial variables. As pointed out by Conway et al. (1959, p. 105),
“in physical experimentation stochastic variability is, by definition, that which lies beyond the control of
the experimenter; simulated experimentation, the stochastic variability, like every other feature of the
model, is deliberately and explicitly placed there by the constructor. Second, it is a more manageable
way to study time-dependent and time-consuming processes such as GSS transition. A computer
simulation can collect longitudinal data more efficiently than a lab or field study (Arrow et al., 2000).
Moreover, as dynamic patterns are not easily described verbally, a computer simulation can visually
present important temporal features of a process in a step-by-step manner (Drazin and Sandelands,
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1992). Third, a computational approach provides a very effective method to answer “what if” questions
(Romme, 2004). Researchers can explore a wide range of possible contingencies that are hard to
implement in lab experiments or field studies due to legal, ethical, or practical reasons. Last but not
the least, in order to translate theories and concepts to computational programmable systems, we
have to specify the causal mechanisms underlying facilitation practices and critical mass of GSS
transition. This makes computational modeling a very helpful approach for CE researchers to identify
the causal elements of packaged facilitation routines.
Of course, due to the complexities of reality, it is not possible to mimic every aspect of the real world
in the computational environment. Therefore, we must, to quote Simon (1990, p. 7), "separate what is
essential from what is dispensable in order to capture in our models a simplified picture of reality,
which nevertheless will allow us to make inferences that are important to our goals.” The goal of our
multi-agent simulation is neither normative (it does not assume idealistic rationality) nor descriptive (it
does not replicate the rich details of a GSS supported work group), but exploratory. If the simulation
produces results that can inform the causal mechanisms or adaptive aspects of common facilitation
practices, it gives us some grounds to believe that the multi-agent modeling method is a useful
approach to uncover new insights about GSS transition issues. By excluding many factors, we can be
sure that their presence does not cause the observed output. What is lost in the level of detail is
gained in the degree of control over the research environment (Prietula et al., 1998). Thus, we take a
parsimonious approach in the multi-agent modeling and only simulate the factors that are both
essential to our research questions and well understood in the literature.
In general, the multi-agent model is an artifact constructed within the design science approach
(Hevner et al., 2004). It is not aimed to be a full-grown information system that can be used in
practice. Instead, the artifact provides a way for the GSS transition problem to be conceived by CE
researchers. As Simon states, “Solving a problem simply means representing it so as to make the
solution transparent” (1996, p. 132).

3.1. The Multi-Agent Model Design
Based on the theory of multi-agent modeling (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), interactions among GSS
facilities, users, and facilitation practices are reduced into four building blocks of a multi-agent model:
agents, properties or attributes of agents, environment, and behavioral rules. The first building block,
agents, is the actors in a system. In our model of work groups, agents are members of a work group.
The number of agents in the model is controlled by the parameter, group size.
The second building block, properties or attributes of agents, is their internal states and
characteristics. In our model, agents have three attributes: belief about others’ GSS use (referred to
as belief), probability of task/technology fit (referred to as task/tech fit), and learning. Belief represents
the uncertainty of other members’ GSS choice. It is a value ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values
meaning lower uncertainty. Belief of each agent is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with
mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.2 (more details later on the calibration of these values). If the
random draw produces a number less than 0 or greater than 1, we set it to 0 or 1, respectively.
Task/tech fit reflects the uncertainty about the potential value of a chosen GSS for a given task. It
varies from 0 to 1, with higher values for lower uncertainty. Learning reflects members’ true
understanding about GSS functions. It is a value from 0 to 1, with a higher value for better
understanding. The initial value of learning is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution between 0
and 1 to represent a diversity of users’ familiarity with GSS. In general, the value of task/tech fit
equals learning, unless agents receive task and technology help (more details on this facilitation rule
later). This represents the situation where members’ ability to match task with GSS is based on their
understanding of the technology, unless there is direct intervening from a facilitator.
The third building block, the environment, is the medium over which agents operate and interact. It is
separate from the agents but interacts with them. In our model, the environment represents the GSS.
It offers benefits (payoffs) to agents based on the coordination outcome. If agents achieve agreement
about GSS use, each agent receives a GSS payoff. If agents fail to adopt the same GSS, those who
did not choose to use the GSS receive a defector payoff (representing their reserved effort), and
those who attempted to use the GSS receive a loser payoff (representing their wasted effort). In the
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framework of a minimum-effort coordination game, the GSS payoff is always higher than the defector
payoff, which in turn is higher than the loser payoff (Skyrms, 2004). Following the payoff structure of
the coordination game and based on model calibration results, we assign the payoff values as shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs of the GSS Facility
The Collective Choices
of Other Agents
GSS
Other Technology
GSS
GSS Payoff (10)
Loser Payoff (0)
Individual
Other
Agent’s Choice
Defector Payoff (3)
Defector Payoff (3)
Technology
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are the values used in the simulation.
The last building block, behavior rules, defines the movements, interactions, and changes of internal
states of agents and the environment. To this study, behavioral rules are the most important
component of the multi-agent model because they reflect our conjectured mechanisms underlying the
facilitation practices in GSS transition. We implement four behavioral rules to represent the four basic
facilitation practices identified in the literature: the champion rule, the restrict rule, the task and
technology help rule, and the training rule.
The champion rule increases the average belief of agents by a certain percentage set by the
simulator users. For example, if belief of agents was initially drawn from a normal distribution with
mean 0.75, and the increase percentage was set to 20 percent, the champion rule will increase the
distribution mean to 0.95. Thus, uncertainty of others’ GSS use is reduced, and agents are more likely
to choose the GSS. The restrict rule also affects belief of agents, but in a different fashion. When the
restrict rule is in effect, belief of agents is changed from its current value to 1 (i.e., uncertainty about
others’ GSS choice is minimized). This reflects the empirical finding that restricting can mechanically
focus members’ beliefs on particular GSS features by limiting the choices available.
The task and technology help rule increases the value of task/tech fit to 1 regardless of agents’
learning. It reflects the direct intervening of facilitators to help members choose appropriate GSS
features for a given task. The training rule increases the value of learning at a fast speed. It
represents the effect of training on improving members’ true understanding of GSS use. The other
three facilitation rules also improve learning, but at a slower speed. This mimics group members’
independent learning as a “by-product” of using GSS. The actual values of the learning speed with
training or without training are set by the simulator users. Table 3 aligns the basic facilitation practices
and their corresponding behavioral rules in the model.
In a round of the model play, agents simultaneously make a choice to use GSS or not, receive payoff
based on their choices and the collective choice of the group, and then update their belief and
learning.
When agents make a choice about GSS use, they calculate the expected value of using GSS with the
following equation:
Expected value of GSS = (my belief of others’ choice) ^ number of other agents * GSS payoff *
task/tech fit2
Essentially, the equation above captures two things: the payoff of GSS use and the likelihood of GSS
use by the whole group. The payoff of GSS use is defined in Table 2. The likelihood of GSS use
encompasses two uncertainties: (1) whether other members will choose the same GSS and (2)
whether the chosen GSS fits the task at hand. In the equation, the first uncertainty is calculated as the
focal agent’s belief of others’ choice raised to the power of the number of other agents. The second
uncertainty is reflected by the task/tech fit variable.
2

The value of task/tech fit equals the learning value, unless the task and technology help rule is in effect.
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Table 3: Alignment between Previous Observations and the Behavioral Rules

Champion

Restrict

Task and
Technology Help

Training

Previous Observation
Increase members’ enthusiasm
and perceived effectiveness of
GSS (e.g., Nunamaker et al.,
1991; George et al., 1992)
Mechanically focus members’
choice
on particular GSS
features (e.g., Hayne, 1999;
Dennis et al., 2001)
Intervene in the task and
technology match during group
meetings (e.g., Dickson et al.,
1993; Clawson et al., 1993)
Educate members about the
functions of GSS (e.g., Boiney,
1998; Dennis and Garfield,
2003)

In the Agent Model
Increase the average belief of
agents about others’ GSS use

Increase belief of agents about
others’ GSS use to 1

Increase the task/tech fit value to 1

Increase learning at a greater
speed than the other facilitation
rules

If the expected value of GSS is greater than the defector payoff, the agent will choose to use the GSS.
Otherwise, the agent will choose to defect (not use the GSS). If all of the agents choose to use the
GSS, the round results in GSS use. On the other hand, if some agents choose not to use GSS, the
round results in coordination failure. Agents will receive payoffs according to Table 2.
At the end of each round, agents update their belief and learning based on the outcome. If the round
achieves GSS use, each agent updates his or her belief using the following calculation:
Updated-belief = current-belief + ((1 – current-belief) * belief-changing-speed)
The above equation captures the concave effect of a GSS use outcome; that is, every time the group
of agents achieves GSS use, their belief about others choosing the same GSS in the future increases.
Meanwhile, the marginal effect of each additional GSS use outcome decreases as the belief value
approaches 1.
If the round results in coordination failure, agents update their belief using:
Updated-belief = current-belief – (current-belief * belief-changing-speed)
This equation reflects the convex effect of coordination failures. Specifically, agents reduce their belief
that others will adopt the GSS when they fail to achieve GSS use. The impairing effect of coordination
failure diminishes as the belief value approaching 0.
Meanwhile, if the training rule is in effect, agents will update their learning using:
Updated-learning = current-learning + ((1 – current-learning) * learning-speed-with-training)
If the training rule in not in effect, agents will update their learning with:
Updated-learning = current-learning + ((1 – current-learning) * learning-speed-without-training)
Both learning update equations produce concave learning curves: each round of model play helps
agents to be more experienced in choosing the appropriate GSS for a given task; the more
experienced agents become, the less improvement they can make with each additional round of
model play. As discussed earlier, the learning speed is faster when the training rule is in effect. The
different learning speeds are reflected by the different parameters (learning-speed-with-training vs.
learning-speed-without-training) in the two equations.

263

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Vol. 10 Special Issue pp. 252-277 March 2009

Nan&Johnston /Multi-Agent Simulation

The decision, belief, and learning update functions of the model indicate that the behavior of agent is
adaptive rather than fully rational. Each agent only has information about his or her own belief and
learning ability. Each has no knowledge of the global distribution of others’ beliefs or learning. After
each round of game play, agents only know their own choice and the collective outcome. They do not
know the specific choice of any other agent. Unlike fully rational actors, who would directly reach an
equilibrium in the coordination game based on mathematical analysis of the payoff structure, agents
in our model gradually converge to an equilibrium of the coordination game by adjusting their choices
based on the history of the game play.
The simulator user can control the number of rounds in the game play. A greater number of rounds
mimics a longer time span of GSS transition. The simulator has the capability to turn a certain
facilitation rule on or off at any point in a simulation session. Thus, as the users of the simulator, we
can examine whether a particular facilitation rule or a combination of several facilitation rules can
induce self-sustained GSS use and how their effectiveness changes at different points in the GSS
transition. Our multi-agent simulator is created in Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999), and its interface is shown
in Figure 4. The interface comprises five main areas: model controls, experiment controls, calibration
parameters, facilitator practices, and the display.

Figure 4. The Interface of the Simulator
The model controls are used to set up and run an individual experiment. A simulator user will first
determine under what conditions he would like to test for the model and then set up the experiment.
To run one round, the user hits the “go” button. To slowly proceed through a round, the user uses the
step button to see the interactions at each stage. In the experiment controls section, a user can run
many rounds and look at the aggregated results. As discussed above, the user will set up the
conditions to be tested and the number of rounds to test the model on. The monitors in the lower left
of the interface show the cumulative results. The calibration parameters are part of the experimental
conditions but have been tested based on previous literature. Users can modify these values to see
for themselves how group size and initial starting beliefs change the nature of the outcomes. The
justification for the specific variable settings in our simulation is discussed in detail in the model
calibration section. The facilitator practices are what we are exploring in this paper. Each practice can
be turned on or off at any time and in any combination. The display is a window on the experiment,
which shows each agent as a person shape. The colors of the agents show their choice in the game:
A red agent has chosen NOT to use the GSS and a blue player has chosen to use the GSS. In
addition, the brightness of the agents indicates how adamantly they made the decisions. For instance,
a barely visible red agent is more likely to switch to blue than a bright red agent. Each agent also has
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an outward link to every other player and an inward link from every other agent. These links maintain
each agent’s current belief about how likely he thinks the other agent is to choose a GSS in question.
The brightness of the lines is a visual clue to show the strength of the belief. The display updates after
each round in a simulation session to reflect the current state of the simulation.

3.2. Model Validation
“Learning" from research using a computational model requires two stages. The first stage is to
understand the behavior of the simulator itself in terms of the properties and behavioral rules. This is
the focus of the section above on model design. The second stage is to translate learning from the
simulation to learning about the actual process. This is generally viewed as the focus of the
validation process. Validation “is the process of building an acceptable level of confidence that an
inference about a simulated process is a correct or valid inference for the actual process” (Van Horn,
1971, p. 247). Rarely will validation result in a "proof" that the simulation is a correct or "true" model of
the real world. The two important characteristics of the validation problem are:
1. The objective is to validate a set of new insights rather than the mechanism that generated the
insights.
2. Validation is problem-dependent. There is no such thing as "the" appropriate validation
procedure (Van Horn, 1971).

Figure 5. The Three-Stage Validation Process
In social science, an approach that has been recommended and performed in a number of simulation
studies (e.g., Naylor and Finger, 1967; Weitzel et al., 2006; Carley, 1996; Kane and Alavi, 2007) is a
three-stage validation process (see Figure 5 for the process in our study). The first stage is grounding.
It focuses on the reasonableness of the causal relations in the simulation model and the fit of the
model with existing theories. The grounding of our multi-agent model was largely addressed in the
discussion about GSS transition, the coordination challenge, and facilitation practices. The behavioral
rules of the simulation model are specifically based on the facilitation routines identified in the
literature, and the interaction among agents is rationalized by the well-established coordination game
theory in economics.
The second stage of the validation process is calibration. It is an iterative process of improving the fit of
the parameter values in the model to the empirical observations available. The parameters of our model
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include group size, GSS/defector/loser payoffs, the mean and standard deviation of belief and the belief
changing speed. These parameters define the context of GSS facilitation rather than directly represent
the facilitation rules. Although variations of the parameter values do affect the simulation results, they are
not the focus of our research questions. In the calibration process, we seek the set of parameter values
that allows us to see the significance of different facilitation practices and variations of their effectiveness
over the lifecycle of GSS transition.
To calibrate reasonable values for the parameters, we ran the simulation model 1000 times for each
of the possible combinations of different values of the parameters (see Johnston, 2006 and Johnston,
2007 for more details). We then compared the results to findings taken from the last 17 years of
experimental research in coordination within different size groups in minimum-effort games (Van
Huyck et al., 1990; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996;
Chaudhuri et al., 2001; Weber, 2006). Out of the possible configurations of parameter values, the
setting with the mean belief 0.75, the standard deviation 0.2, the belief changing speed 0.75, GSS
payoff 10, defector payoff 3, loser payoff 0, and group size 10 produced the best fit with the prior
findings.
The last stage is verification, which is the process of demonstrating the reasonableness of the
simulation results and the fit of the results to real world observations. Because there is rarely an
existing real world counterpart for every simulated condition, we cannot demonstrate the consistency
of all variations in the simulation and all real world conditions (otherwise, we do not need to use
simulation). Verification usually involves showing—for at least a few versions of the simulated system
and the comparable conditions in real world—that the simulator produces results not inconsistent with
the performance of the real system. Certainly, the match between a few variations of simulation and
real world conditions does little to establish the virtue of other variations of the model. Thus, this
widely applied and accepted test is essentially a null test: a model that failed to pass would be
exceedingly suspect, but a model passed is not proved to be valid (Conway et al., 1959). Ultimately,
verification is aimed at improving our faith in the insights gained from the simulation.
We perform model verification after conducting experiments with the multi-agent simulation. For the
results produced by the simulation experiment, we look for comparable empirical findings in the
literature and see whether the implications from the simulation and the empirical findings are
consistent. More details on model verification are presented at the end of the results section.
As indicated by Figure 5, the three-stage validation process is not an isolated step in our research
program. Instead, it is a persistent concern throughout this study and, thus, the process of validation
is “embedded” as part of the theoretical development (grounding), model design (calibration), and
result discussion (verification).

3.3. Experimentation in the Multi-Agent Model
We conduct a full factorial design experiment to explore the separate and combined effects of the
facilitation rules. The goal of the experiment is twofold. First, we intend to gain insights into the
propositions about facilitation practices. Second, we attempt to illustrate the value of the multi-agent
simulation as an approach to gain new knowledge and ask new questions about the GSS transition
issue. Table 4 lists the dimensions and the levels of each dimension of the factorial design experiment.
This design results in 92,160 factorial conditions for the simulation experiment. A factor worth mentioning
is egress of facilitation. This dimension of the factorial design is intended to test the sustainability of
facilitation practices. By terminating the facilitation rules at different points in the GSS transition lifecycle,
we can see how effective the facilitation rules are in inducing self-sustained use of GSS.
The outcome measure of the experiment is the likelihood of achieving self-sustained GSS use (i.e., the
number of sessions achieving GSS use in the last round divided by the total number of sessions in a
factorial condition). By comparing the likelihood values across different factorial conditions, we can
assess the impact of different facilitation practices under varied settings of the model variables.
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Table 4: The Factorial Design Experiment
Dimension

Number
of Levels

Level

The champion rule

Present, Absent

2

The restrict rule

Present, Absent

2

The task and tech help rule

Present, Absent

2

The training rule
The percentage
Increase of belief resulted from
the champion rule

Present, Absent

2

10%,15%, 20%, 25%

4

Learning-speedwith-training
Learning-speedwithout-training
Total rounds of game play
Egress of facilitation
after the specified round

0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85
0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5

6

6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,12, 13, 14,15

4
10

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

6

92,160
Total Number of Factorial Conditions
Notes: The numbers in bold are the set of variable settings we selected for result
reporting

4. Results
We performed 100 sessions of simulation in each of the 92,160 factorial conditions. To scope down
the results for reporting, we first selected a subset of factorial conditions that could effectively
represent variations in facilitation effects. Specifically, we chose the factorial conditions with 20
percent as the increase in belief resulted from the champion rule, 0.75 as the learning-speed-withtraining, 0.5 as the learning-speed-without-training, and 12 as the total rounds of game play.
Conditions with other settings of the variables either did not generate enough variations for further
examination, or produced results that were consistent with the selected subset.
In the selected subset of factorial conditions, we identified several interesting patterns in the
simulation results. First, 11 out of the 16 possible combinations of the facilitation rules can induce
GSS use. However, their effectiveness varies. Each facilitation rule alone is generally ineffective in
producing self-sustained GSS use. Among all the combinations of two facilitation practices, the
restrict rule and the task and technology help rule together are associated with the highest likelihood
of a GSS use outcome. A combination of at least three facilitation practices can always induce some
GSS use outcomes. We list the 16 combinations and their experiment outcomes in Table 5. In the
table, each row with a non-zero likelihood outcome represents an effective portfolio of facilitation
practices to induce GSS use. By the model design, we know precisely the causal pathway underlying
each practice in the facilitation portfolios. Overall, findings in Table 5 offer a fine-grained
understanding of the relative effects of the multiple pathways for facilitation to induce GSS use.
When allowing facilitation rules to terminate in the middle of a simulation session, we found that the
sustainability of the facilitation rules varied. In general, the training rule enhances the sustainability of
other facilitation rules. As shown in Table 6, the likelihood of reaching self-sustained GSS use tends
to be higher when the training rule is present before we terminated all the other facilitation rules. We
performed two-sample proportion tests to compare the likelihood of achieving self-sustained GSS use
with and without the training rule (see Table 6 for the p values). Moreover, the longer the training rule
remained in a simulation session, the more likely a self-sustained GSS use outcome occurs. For
example, for the combination of the restrict, task and technology help, and the training rules,
facilitation egress after the first round failed to result in any self-sustained GSS use outcome, while
egress after the second round generated a 30 percent GSS use outcomes.
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Table 5: Experiment Results of Combinations of the Facilitation Rules
Task and
Likelihood of GSS Use
Restrict
Champion
Training
Tech Help
yes
yes
1%
yes
0
yes
0
0
yes
yes
yes
2%
yes
yes
4%
yes
yes
0
yes
0
yes
yes
yes
100%
yes
yes
100%
yes
yes
6%
yes
4%
yes
yes
yes
yes
99%
yes
yes
yes
100%
yes
yes
yes
4%
yes
yes
7%
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule, while a blank cell means absence of the rule.
Table 6: Experiment Results with Egress of Facilitation Rules
Likelihood of GSS Use
Egress after
Egress after
Task and
Restrict
Champion
Training
Round 1
Round 2
Tech help
%
p
%
p
yes
yes
0
0
na
na
yes
0
0
yes
0
0
na
na
0
0
yes
yes
yes
5
7
0.37
0.04*
yes
yes
4
2
yes
yes
0
0
na
na
yes
0
0
yes
yes
yes
0
na
30
0.002**
yes
yes
0
13
yes
yes
0
6
na
0.15
yes
0
3
yes
yes
yes
yes
22 0.006**
91
0.13
yes
yes
yes
9
86
yes
yes
yes
1
3
0.5
0.65
yes
yes
1
4
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule while a blank cell means absence of the
rule. * for significance at 0.05 and ** for significance at 0.01.
The varied sustainability of the facilitation rules motivated us to ask a new question: Does the timing
of the presence of a facilitation practice modify its sustainability? We conducted a follow-up
experiment with the facilitation rules present in the last two rounds of a simulation session (see Table
7 for results). We found that the timing of the presence of facilitation matters. When facilitation is
made available in the last 2 rounds of a simulation session, the likelihood of achieving a GSS use
outcome tends to be much lower than in the cases when the facilitation rules are present in the first
two rounds of a session. This implies that the earlier GSS users can receive facilitation, the better the
GSS transition outcome may be. Results in Table 7 also indicate that the restrict rule becomes pivotal
in the late presence of facilitation. Meanwhile, the training rule does not seem to make much

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

Vol. 10 Special Issue pp. 252-277 March 2009

268

Nan&Johnston/Multi-Agent Simulation

difference when made available later in a simulation session. An insight gained here is that later in the
GSS transition process, when users’ belief in GSS use has been substantially “damaged” by
coordination failures, the facilitation practices that boost users’ belief are more important than those
that help them understand the technology.
Table 7: Experiment Results of Late Presence of the Facilitation Rules
Likelihood of GSS
Task and
Training
Restrict Champion
Use
Tech Help
yes
yes
0
yes
0
yes
0
0
yes
yes
yes
0
yes
yes
0
yes
yes
0
yes
0
yes
yes
yes
5%
yes
yes
1%
yes
yes
3%
yes
3%
yes
yes
yes
yes
3%
yes
yes
yes
6%
yes
yes
yes
2%
yes
yes
1%
Notes: “yes” means presence of the rule, while a blank cell means absence of
the rule.
Table 8: Model Verification
Findings in
Real World Settings
GSS facilities are self-extinguishing
(Briggs et al., 2003)
Some initial training alone is ineffective in
inducing GSS transition
(Dickson et al., 1993)
A combination of training and restrictive
GSS can lead to self-sustained GSS use
(Hayne, 1999)
Experiential learning is important for users
to adapt GSS to their work processes
(Dennis and Garfield, 2003)
Organizations would eagerly embrace a
GSS facility for two years and then
abandon it (Briggs et al., 2003)

Early presentation of a GSS to users is
important (Orlikowski, 2000)

Findings in
the Simulation Conditions
Absence of the facilitation rules
results in zero GSS use outcome
Presence of the training rule alone
results in zero GSS use outcome
A combination of the training and
the restrict rule can induce 6%
likelihood of a GSS use outcome
The training rule can enhance the
sustainability of other facilitation
effects
Several facilitation portfolios (e.g.,
the restrict rule, or the restrict and
the task and technology help rules
combined) cannot produce selfsustained GSS use after the
facilitation rules are terminated
Facilitation provided in the first two
rounds is more effective in
inducing self-sustained GSS use
than that provided in the last two
rounds of a simulation session

Taken together, the findings help us achieve the two goals for multi-agent simulation. First, they offer
us a more sophisticated view of the contributions of facilitation to self-sustained GSS use. We not
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only gain insights into the relative effect of different portfolios of facilitation practices (in relation to P1),
but also recognize that the effects may vary depending on the available duration and timing of the
facilitation practices (in relation to P2). Second, the findings indicate the value of the multi-agent
modeling approach. The fact that we could conduct a large-scale full factorial design longitudinal
experiment shows that the multi-agent simulation is a manageable approach to study dynamic social
processes. The follow-up experiment about the late presence of facilitation rules further indicates that
the multi-agent method is effective in answering “what if” questions.
As the last stage of the model validation, we revisit the GSS literature to look for comparable findings
for the simulation results. As discussed earlier, it is usually impossible to find a real world counterpart
for every condition in the simulation. Thus, we perform the model verification for a selected set of
results for which we could identify related findings in the literature. The comparison between the
simulation and the empirical results is presented in Table 8. In general, we do not see any significant
inconsistencies between the two sets of findings. The model verification enhances our confidence in
the insights gained from the multi-agent model.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we apply the multi-agent framework to understand the contributions of facilitation as a
coordination mechanism in GSS transition. By formalizing the interdependent decision making of
GSS users as strategic behaviors in a minimum-effort coordination game, we interpret the
contributions of facilitation as interventions to coordination failures in the game play. We develop a
multi-agent simulator to gain insights into the propositions about facilitation practices. Through the
simulation experimentation, we find separate and combined effects of the basic facilitation practices
at different points in a GSS transition lifecycle.
The findings from the multi-agent simulation offer several important implications for CE research and
practice. First, CE researchers can employ the multiple pathway view of the facilitation practices to
examine the causal mechanisms underlying best facilitation practices identified in the field.
Recognizing the specific causal pathways helps CE researchers to codify the core and most effective
collections of facilitation routines. Second, this study calls for attention to the adaptive dimension of
facilitation routines. The simulation results show that some facilitation practices such as restricting
GSS use may be effective in initiating GSS use, but not in sustaining the facilitation benefit. In
contrast, facilitation practices such as training may not appear to be helpful when used alone, but are
very important for sustaining GSS use in the long run. Moreover, our findings imply that initiating an
agreement of GSS use at the beginning of GSS transition is easier than correcting coordination
failures later in the transition process. These findings suggest that packaged facilitation routines
should include an additional component: the schedule for administering different facilitation practices.
Based on an understanding of effectiveness of facilitation practices at different points in the GSS
transition lifecycle, the schedule can vary the duration and intensity of different facilitation routines.
This schedule can greatly enhance the adaptability of the CE approach to the dynamic nature of
human interactions.
The theoretical development and the multi-agent model of this study contribute to the literature in
several ways. First, to our knowledge, this study presents the first formal characterization of the
coordination problem during GSS transition. It also develops the critical mass view suggested by prior
studies (e.g., DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Grudin, 1994; Gallivan, 2001). By articulating selfsustained GSS use as a coordination problem, we are able to draw on a rich body of literature from
behavioral economics. To some extent, this study serves as a bridge between the CE literature and
the game theory in economics. The minimum-effort coordination game framework and the
propositions about facilitation’s contributions open up the “black box” of the impact of human
interactions on GSS transition and the moderating effect of facilitation practices. By mapping the
common facilitation practices of the two general interventions to coordination failures in the minimumeffort game, we offer a fine-grained view of the multiple pathways underlying how facilitation results in
self-sustained GSS use.
A second contribution of this study is the multi-agent simulator. The simulator is essentially an artifact
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developed based on the design science approach (Hevner et al., 2004). Following the fundamental
principle of design science (Hevner et al., 2004), we demonstrate a valuable approach to gain
knowledge and understanding of a design problem (in this study, packaging the best practices of
facilitation) through the building and application of the simulator. Although the findings from the
simulator cannot be applied in a strict numeric sense, they help us realize nuances of GSS facilitation
that are difficult to identify in either laboratory or field studies. For example, by designing facilitation
behavioral rules in the multi-agent model, we achieve an in-depth understanding about how
facilitation may affect GSS use by modifying the inputs to the decision, belief, or learning functions of
agents. Moreover, when conducting experiments in the simulator, we identify new questions (e.g., the
timing of the presence of facilitation) and perform immediate follow-up research. This would be
difficult to pursue with other research approaches. We believe that the multi-agent simulator is a
valuable tool for the CE community to gain new insights and pose questions from new angles.
Subsequently, it improves the effectiveness of the CE community by extending the value of the best
facilitation practices to more GSS supported work processes.

5.1. Limitation and Future Work
This study represents the starting point of our inquiry into the dynamic and adaptive characteristics of
GSS transition with multi-agent simulation. At the current stage, the multi-agent model is still an
oversimplified version of real world processes. While the simplification is necessary to accommodate
the exploratory nature of the study, it leads to several limitations of this paper.
First, this study leaves out some important factors in the GSS context such as group cohesion and
power. A next step for our inquiry is to incorporate these important factors. For example, a possible
way to implement group cohesion in the multi-agent model is to utilize social network techniques. We
can employ the link functions in Netlogo to represent social links among agents. Then, group
cohesion can be measured as the strength and density of the social links. We anticipate that group
cohesion has a positive effect on self-sustained GSS use, because strong social links among agents
help improve their belief about others’ GSS use intention. The social network approach is also a
potential way to implement power in the multi-agent simulation. Power may be measured as the
degree of centrality of each agent in the social network. An interesting question regarding power is
whether it moderates the contribution of facilitation to GSS transition. One conjecture is that
participation of powerful people in GSS transition may enhance the effectiveness of facilitation
because they increase the willingness of other members to adopt the technology.
Second, we fixed several parameter values (e.g., group size and payoffs) in the current simulation in
order to focus on the variables that are most relevant to our research questions. In the future, we plan
to relax the parameter values to test their impact on the GSS transition outcome. For example, with
respect to group size, experimental economic studies already provided some evidence that
coordination is harder to achieve in larger groups (Weber, 2006). We anticipate that GSS use will be
more difficult to reach and sustain as group size increases, because each additional member
introduces more heterogeneity in interest or effort in GSS use. In addition, regarding payoffs, an
interesting aspect to explore in future work is to vary the discrepancy between the GSS and defector
payoffs. The discrepancy affects the tension between individual risk and group efficiency (Cooper et
al., 1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990). We expect that the higher the GSS payoff relative to the defector
payoff, the more likely agents will achieve GSS use, because the relatively higher GSS payoff makes
GSS use a more appealing choice.
Another common concern of the computational approach is that the results seem to be “predetermined” by the model design. It is true that the results are logical consequences of the model
construction (otherwise, there is serious internal validity problem of the computational model).
However, this does not mean that the new insights that emerged and the new questions asked during
the model building and application processes could be predicted based on the initial model design.
Once researchers understand how the behavioral rules in our model can generate the results, the
value of our model in uncovering new insights and representing issues in a fresh new light is realized.
As one of the first studies looking at the coordination problem in GSS transition, this paper shows the
relevance of the subject and the need for further research. The theoretical development and the multi271
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agent simulation are exploratory in nature. They warrant future work that can more precisely describe
and predict the effect of certain facilitation practices on self-sustained GSS use and, thereby, improve
the performance of the CE approach.
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Appendix A: Tutorial on Coordination Games
The basic form of a coordination game, usually called pure coordination game, is characterized by
complete symmetry between players, between strategies and between equilibria (Mehta et al., 1994).
A classic example of pure coordination game is the game of “Heads and Tails” from Schelling’s
seminal work (1960). In the game, multiple players write down either “heads” or “tails.” If they
simultaneously write down the same word, each is paid some given amount of money. If they write
down different words, they receive nothing. In this pure coordination game, players have the same
payoff structure, the same strategies (“heads” or “tails”) and the same expected value if either “heads”
or “tails” becomes their unanimous choice.
The pure coordination game has been refined in several ways to represent more complex situations.
One family of refined coordination games is called minimum effort games (Van Huyck et al., 1990;
Camerer and Knez, 2000; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Chaudhuri et al.,
2001). In a minimum effort game, players have to invest some effort to achieve a potential payoff, but
the actual payoff to all players is tied to the effort of the person who contributes the least. A simple
example of minimum effort games is a chain-building exercise. In the game, each member of a group
is responsible for building one link of the chain. Each member can either invest $1 to build a weak link
or invest $10 to build a strong link. After each member has independently decided whether to build a
weak or strong link, the links are joined into a chain and the strength of the chain is tested. The chain
is only as strong as the weakest link; that is, the chain is strong if all the links are strong or weak even
if only one weak link is present. Each member in the group earns $5 if the chain is weak or $30 if the
chain is strong. Thus, a person who chooses to build a weak link earns $4 regardless of the choices
of others whereas a person who chooses to build a strong link may either lose $5 or earn $20
depending on others’ actions. The chain-building exercise demonstrates an essential difficulty in
coordination: the dilemma between protecting individual resources or investing the resources towards
a group goal, but taking the risk of losing individual investment.
One distinct feature of this type of minimum effort game is that coordination can still occur at separate
outcomes, such as strong link building and weak link building in the chain-building exercise. However,
there are obvious differences in potential benefits of outcomes. The coordination games with such
asymmetric benefits of outcomes are often referred to as coordination games with Pareto-ranked
equilibria. Here, an equilibrium (or pure-strategy Nash equilibrium) is a game outcome in which no
player can gain anything by being the only person to change his/her choice (Gibbons, 1992). When
we order the equilibria of a coordination game by their potential benefits to the whole group, we get
Pareto-ranked equilibria. The equilibrium with the highest potential benefit is called the Pareto optimal
equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992). Experimental economists find that players often fail to choose the Pareto
optimal equilibrium in a coordination game even if the Pareto ranking is salient (Camerer, 2003; Van
Huyck et al., 1990, 1991; Cooper et al., 1990, 1992). They attribute the result to strategic uncertainty.
That is, players either do not interpret the Pareto ranking correctly or they are uncertain about other
players’ interpretation. Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria reveal another difficulty in
coordination: uncertainty about potential benefits of outcomes. Table A1 shows a comparison
between the minimum-effort coordination game with the pure coordination game.
Table A1: Comparison of Coordination Games
Symmetry between
Example
Strategies
Pure coordination Heads and Yes
game
Tails
players invest the
same amount of
effort and have the
same payoff
Minimum effort
Chain
No
game
building
players can invest
exercise
different amounts of
effort and get
different payoff
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Pareto-Ranked
Equilibria
No
all equilibria of the
game are equally
good.

Types
of
Uncertainty
Uncertainty about
other players’ choice

Yes
(1)Uncertainty about
some equilibria of
other players’
the game offer
choice
more benefits than (2)Uncertainty about
the rank of a
others.
equilibrium
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